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THE HALFWAY HOUSE AS PRIVATE NUISANCE
Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation v. Needler,
- Ark. -, 477 S.W.2d 821 (1972)
Plaintiffs sued to enjoin as a private nuisance in fact defendant's op-
eration of a halfway house for paroled prisoners in a mixed business
and residential area. Evidence showed a decrease in surrounding prop-
erty value, fear on the part of neighbors, conviction of one of the resi-
dents of the house for a sex offense, and removal of another resident
for activities related to alcohol. The Chancellor granted the injunction
and defendant appealed. Held: affirmed.' The preponderance of
evidence established that the operation of the halfway house constituted
a private nuisance in fact.
Although incapable of exact definition,2 a nuisance commonly is
defined as an interference with another's interest in the enjoyment and
use of real property.3 A private nuisance interferes with a relatively
small area of private land4 or the use by an individual of his own
land.5 A private nuisance in fact is only a nuisance in certain locations
or surroundings" and must be both a substantial and an unreasonable
1. - Ark. -, 477 S.W.2d 821 (1972).
2. C. HEPBURN, CASES ON TORTS ch. 5 (3d ed. 1954); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 86 (4th ed. 1971); P. WINFIELD, TORTS 442 (5th ed. 1950); Seavey, Nui-
suance: Contributory Negligence and other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REv. 984 (1952).
3. See Oleck, Nuisance in a Nutshell, 5 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 148 (1956); Yerke,
The Law of Nuisance in Oregon, I WILLAmETTE L.J. 289 (1960). Nuisance can
be defined as either "conduct" or an "interest invaded." The Restatement writers
took the position that nuisance refers to the interest invaded. RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS ch. 40 (1939). But see Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and
Other Mysteries, 65 HARv. L. REv. 984, 985 (1952).
4. Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956); Seavey,
supra note 2, at 984.
5. Mandell v. Pivnick, 20 Conn. Supp. 99, 125 A.2d 175, (1956); Cox v. Ray M.
Lee Co., 100 Ga. App. 333, 111 S.E.2d 246 (1959); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-
Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Adams v. Hamilton Carhartt Overall
Co., 293 Ky. 443, 169 S.W.2d 294 (1943); Lederman v. Cunningham, 283 S.W.2d
108, 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
6. See C. MARrz, RIGHTS INCIDENT TO POSSESSION OF LAND § 28.26 (1954). A
nuisance per se or absolute nuisance is a nuisance anywhere and under all circum-
stances. Echave v. Grand Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 193 P.2d 277 (1948) (unsanitary
dwelling not a nuisance per se); Ehrlick v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 742, 102 S.W.
289 (1907) (gaming house a nuisance per se); Clifford v. Dam, 81 N.Y. 52, 56 (1880)
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interference with the use and enjoyment of another's property.7 In de-
termining whether the interference is substantial and unreasonable,
courts give primary consideration to the circumstances of the particular
case.8 In balancing the utility of the use against the harm of the inter-
ference,9 courts consider various factors, including 0 depreciation of
(hole in street a nuisance per se). But see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 87 (4th
ed. 1971), challenging the validity of the doctrine; and Seavey, supra note 2, at 991,
defining "absolute nuisance" as the intentional creation of a dangerous condition.
7. Helms v. Eastern Kansas Oil Co., 102 Kan. 164, 166, 169 P. 208, 209 (1917);
Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 804 (La. App. 1971); RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939); Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Con-
flicts, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 293 (1963).
8. Wetstone v. Cantor, 144 Conn. 77, 80, 127 A.2d 70, 72 (1956); Riter v.
Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 722, 82 N.W.2d 151, 158 (1951); Caldwell
v. Knox Concrete Prod., Inc., 54 Tenn. App. 393, 391 S.W.2d 59 (1964); Riblet v.
Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 254, 248 P.2d 380, 382 (1952).
9. Grey v. Mayor of City of Patterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 393, 45 A. 995, 997
(1900); McCann v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N.Y. 301, 305, 105 N.E. 416, 417 (1911);
Davis v. Town of Harrisonburg, 116 Va. 864, 869, 83 S.E. 401, 403 (1914); C.
MARTZ, RIGHTS INCIDENT TO POSSESSION OF LAND § 28.22 (1954); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 829 (1939).
10. In addition to the factors listed in the text, courts may consider: physical
invasion of the property, Lamereaux v. Tula, 312 Mass. 359, 44 N.E.2d 789 (1942)
(water flow); Peterson v. King County, 45 Wash. 2d 860, 278 P.2d 774 (1954) (mud-
slide); Forbus v. Knight, 24 Wash. 2d 297, 163 P.2d 822 (1945) (tree roots); delay
in taking action, Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151
(1957) (laches); Borsvold v. United Dairies, 347 Mich. 672, 81 N.W.2d 378 (1957)
(laches); Grey v. Mayor of City of Patterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (1900)
(laches); Laurence v. Tucker, 160 Ore. 474, 85 P.2d 374 (1936) (adverse posses-
sion); Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177 P. 418 (1878) (laches);
social pressure, Holmen v. Athens Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919)
(impossible in city to avoid smoke); Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn.
374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919) (home protected from stone crusher); economic conse-
quences of abatement, see Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21
STAN. L. Rnv. 293 (1969); and cases cited notes 24-27 infra; sequence of events,
Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W. 724 (1922) (growth
of city around alleged nuisance no defense); Menolascine v. Superior Felt & Belting
Co., 313 Ill. App. 557, 40 N.E.2d 813 (1942) (no defense that the nuisance existed
before the plaintiff bought the property); Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15
Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942) (voluntary purchaser of property in existing in-
dustrial district not entitled to recover for dust); Hite v. Cashmere Cemetary Ass'n,
158 Wash. 421, 290 P. 1008 (1930) (purchaser of land near existing cemetary not en-
titled to complain of depreciation of property value); sanction by public authority,
Jones v. Kelley Trust Co., 179 Ark. 857, 18 S.W.2d 356 (1929) (permit to operate
quarry no defense); Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W.
724 (1922) (license to operate business no defense); Jeffers v. Montana Power Co.,
68 Mont. 114, 217 P. 652 (1923) (authorization by legislature sets higher standard
of proof in nuisance action); State v. WOR-TV Tower, 39 N.J. Super. 583, 121
A.2d 764 (1956) (authorization by legislature sets higher standard of proof in nui-
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property values," harm or fear of harm to the person,' 2 discomfort
or inconvenience to the plaintiff,13 duration or recurrence of the inter-
ference, 14 character of the harm,'3 opportunities to avoid or reduce the
injury,' character of the neighborhood,' 7 public interest in the use,' 8
sance action); Lowell v. Pendleton Auto Co., 123 Ore. 383, 261 P. 415 (1927) (parking
ordinance no defense in action against stored cars); City of Amarillo v. Ware, 120
Tex. 456, 40 S.W.2d 57 (1931) (city not immune while building sewers).
11. Klassen v. Central Kan. Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 160 Kan. 697, 704, 165
P.2d 601, 607 (1946) (action by tenant); City of Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co.,
87 Md. 352, 361, 39 A. 1081, 1084 (1898); Bowden v. Edison Elec. Ill. Co., 29 Misc.
171, 172, 60 N.Y.S. 835, 836 (1899) (action by tenant); City of Amarillo v. Ware,
120 Tex. 456, 468, 40 S.W.2d 57, 61 (1931); Drake v. Smith, 54 Wash. 2d 57, 62,
337 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1959); Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wash. 2d 275, 282, 300 P.2d 569,
573 (1956); Turtle v. Fitchett, 156 Wash. 328, 332, 287 P. 7, 8 (1930).
12. Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 109 P. 788 (1910) (fear of cancer hospital);
Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S.W. 1046 (1923) (fear of ex-
plosion); City of Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 Md. 352, 39 A. 1081 (1898)
(fear of leprosy hospital); Fields v. Stokleey, 99 Pa. 306 (1882) (fear of fire); Everett
v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910) (fear of tuberculosis hospital).
13. Hansen v. Independent School Dist., 61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959 (1940)
(excessive light and noise); Menolascino v. Superior Felt & Bedding Co., 313 Ill. App.
557, 40 N.E.2d 813 (1942) (dust); McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429,
118 N.W. 786 (1908) (smoke); Sarraillon v. Stevenson, 153 Neb. 182, 43 N.W.2d
509 (1950) (odor); Hooks v. International Speedway, Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 140 S.E.2d
387 (1965) (loud noise); Gorman v. Sabe, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956) (loud
noise); Borsvold v. United Dairies, 347 Mich. 672, 81 N.W.2d 378 (1957) (loud
noise); Guarnia v. Bogart, 407 Pa. 307, 180 A.2d 557 (1962) (loud noise); Drake v.
Smith, 54 Wash. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 1059 (1959) (water pollution).
14. Jones v. Adler, 183 Ala. 435, 62 So. 777 (1913) (occasional smoke); Theil
v. Cernin, 224 Ark. 854, 276 S.W.2d 677 (1955) (odor); Flippin v. McCabe, 228 Ark.
495, 308 S.W.2d 824 (1928) (smoke only during damp weather); Holman v. Athens
Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919) (occasional smoke); State v.
WOR-TV Tower, 39 N.J. Super. 583, 121 A.2d 764 (1956) (occasional fall of ice
from television tower); Francisco v. Department of Institutions and Agencies, 13 N.J.
Misc. 663, 180 A. 843 (1935) (occasional odor); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 827,
Comment b (1939).
15. Gainey v. Folkamn, 114 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1953) (trivial injury); Clark
v. Hunt, 192 Ark. 865, 95 S.W.2d 558 (1936) (no anticipatory injunction); Cooper v.
Whissen, 95 Ark. 545, 130 S.W. 703 (1910) (no anticipatory injunction); Nichol-
son v. Connecticut Half-way House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1958) (no
anticipatory injunction); Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592 (1951) (no
anticipatory injunction); City of Richmond v. House, 177 Ky. 814, 198 S.W. 218
(1917) (no anticipatory injunction); Olsen v. City of Baton Rouge, 247 So. 2d 889
(La. App. 1971) (no anticipatory injunction); Cook v. City of Fall River, 239 Mass.
90, 131 N.E. 346 (1927) (no anticipatory injunction); McCann v. Chasm Power Co.,
211 N.Y. 301, 105 N.E. 416 (1914) (no injunction for purely technical harm).
16. De Blois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621, 623 (D. Mass. 1930); Dauberman v. Grant,
198 Cal. 586, 591, 246 P. 319, 321 (1926); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Grabill, 50
Ill. 241, 245 (1869); Sprague v. Sampson, 120 Me. 353, 114 A. 305 (1921); Jenkins
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reasonableness of defendant's use,' 9 and the motive20 or intent2' of the
defendant.
The Arkansas court, in sustaining the injunction, gave primary con-
sideration to three factors: a "significant decrease" in the value of sur-
rounding property, the plaintiff's fear of harm,22 and the character of
the harm. Conviction of one resident for a sex offense and the involve-
ment of another in incidents involving alcohol demonstrated that the
harm was not speculative or conjectural. The court gave little weight
to evidence that the defendant sought to avoid the harm by excluding
from the residence alcoholics and persons convicted of sex offenses, drug
offenses or drug habituation; that the association of convicts was a
technical violation of Department of Correction rules; and that the
neighborhood was mixed residential and business.
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 331, 51 A. 704 (1902); Barrlett v. Lopez, 67 N.M.
697, 262 P.2d 981 (1953); Kuhn v. Wood, 36 N.E.2d 1006, 1008 (Ohio App. 1941);
Powell v. Superior Portland Cement Inc., 15 Wash. 2d 14, 18, 129 P.2d 536, 538
(1942).
17. Howard v. Etchieson, 228 Ark. 809, 811, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474 (1958); Ben-
ton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843, 845-47, 31 S.E.2d 6, 7-8 (1944); Phelps v. Winch, 309
Ill. 158, 159-60, 140 N.E. 847, 848-49 (1923); Hofstetter v. Myers, 170 Kan. 564,
568, 228 P.2d 522, 526 (1951); Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 1090-91, 168 So.
306, 309 (1936); Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371
(1914); Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 111, 29 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1947); Ture-
man v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 224-25, 263 S.W. 202, 204 (1924); Sou Koup v. Re-
public Steel Corp., 78 Ohio App. 87, 99, 66 N.E.2d 334, 340 (1946); George v. Good-
ovich, 288 Pa. 48, 52, 135 A. 719, 721 (1927); Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light
Co., 281 Pa. 166, 168, 126 A. 345, 347 (1924); Dahl v. Utah Refining Co., 71 Utah
1, 12, 262 P. 269, 273 (1927); Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wash. 2d 559, 392 P.2d 808
(1964).
18. Dixie Ice Cream Co. v. Blackwell, 217 Ala. 330, 332, 116 So. 348, 349 (1929);
Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 236 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Mo. App. 1951); Johns
Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 524, 246 P.2d 554, 562 (1952); Booth-
Kelly Lumber Co. v. City of Eugene, 67 Ore. 381, 384, 136 P. 29, 30 (1913); Hannum
v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417, 423-24, 31 A.2d 99, 102 (1943); Steele v. Queen City
Broadcasting Co., 54 Wash. 2d 402, 408, 341 P.2d 499, 504-05 (1959); Powell v.
Superior Portland Cement Inc., 15 Wash. 2d 14, 20, 129 P.2d 536, 539 (1942).
19. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, Comment j (1939); Smith, Reasonable
Use as Justification for Damage to a Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. Rav. 383 (1917).
20. Larkin v. Tsavaris, 85 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1956); White v. Bernhart, 41
Idaho 665, 669, 241 P. 367, 368 (1925); Flaharty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N.W.
381 (1890); Medford v. Levy, 31 W. Va. 649, 657, 8 S.E. 302, 306 (1888).
21. Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1927); Barr v. Adam
Eidemilier, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 421, 126 A.2d 403, 406 (1956); Jost v. Dairyland Power
Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d 164, 173, 172 N.W.2d 647, 652 (1969).
22. The court found the fear substantiated by law enforcement officials' testimony
that a congregating of convicts usually creates problems. Arkansas Release Guidance
Foundation v. Needler, - Ark. -, 477 S.W.2d 821, 822 (1972).
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Though the factors considered by the court show economic and
mental harm to the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property,
the court failed to mention several important factors. One factor is
the public interest in the use to which the defendant was putting its
land. Halfway houses, as an intermediate step between prison and full
return to society, attempt to reduce crime and rehabilitate criminals by
helping the convict readjust to life in society. If halfway houses are
effective,23 the court should balance the public interest in the reduction
of crime with the interference with plaintiffs' use of their land. Most
courts will consider the public interests in deciding whether an injunc-
tion should be issued for a nuisance. Although the benefit may be
more difficult to prove in the case of a halfway house than in cases of
public schools, 24 public utilities, 25 sanitation services, 26 factories, 27 ce-
ment plants, 8 or airports,29 it is not so minimal as to be unworthy of
23. Little hard evidence exists of the effectiveness of halfway houses because of
the short period in which such programs have been in operation and because of the
shortage of funds for program evaluation. The informally reported experience of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, however, offers encouragement for the idea that com-
munity-based programs can lead to a reduction in recidivism among a substantial
proportion of the participants. Moeller, The Continuum of Corrections, 381 ANNALS
OF AMER. ACADEMY OF POL. & Soc. Sci. 85-86 (1969).
24. Johnson v. Independent School Dist. 1, 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d 421
(1947).
25. Northern Public Serv. Co. v. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 200 N.E. 620 (1936)
(gas plant); Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936)
(railroad); Pappenheim v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 128 N.Y. 436, 28 N.E. 518
(1891) (railroad).
26. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Webb v. Town
of Rye, 108 N.H. 147, 230 A.2d 223 (1967); Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland,
195 Ore. 505, 246 P.2d 554 (1952).
27. Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Ala. 468, 471, 6 So. 192, 193 (1888) (smelter).;
Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 82 Idaho 263, 269, 352 P.2d 235, 237-38 (1960) (phos-
phate plant); Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Ky. 1960)
(refinery); Roy v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 262 Mich. 663, 667-68, 247 N.W. 774, 776
(1933) (factory); Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich.
279, 285, 215 N.W. 325, 328 (1927) (paper mill); York v. Stalings, 217 Ore. 13,
21-23, 341 P.2d 529, 533-34 (1959) (saw mill); Hannun v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417,
422-23, 31 A.2d 99, 102 (1943) (dye works); Madison v. Ducktown Sulpher, Cop-
per & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 336, 83 S.W. 658, 666 (1904) (smelter); Oliver v.
Forney Cotton Oil and Grinding Co., 226 S.W. 1094, 1097-98 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) (cotton gin); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.L 411, 421, 173 A. 627, 631
(1934) (oil refinery).
28. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970),
apparently overruling Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E.
805 (1913); McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907);
Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900). See Note, Torts-Com-
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consideration. Closely tied with this consideration and with the char-
acter of the neighborhood is the reasonableness of defendant's use.
Since the neighborhood was mixed residential and business, plaintiffs
obviously could not expect to be surrounded only by private residences.
Moreover, defendant's selection of such a neighborhood appears rea-
sonable since its use, if a nuisance at all, would be a more substantial
and unreasonable interference in a purely residential neighborhood.
Placement of the house in a purely commercial or industrial setting
or in an unpopulated district would provide little opportunity for the
integration of the convicts into society and, thus, defeat the purpose of
the house.30 The rationale of the Arkansas court eliminates halfway
houses altogether or reduces their effectiveness to the point of little
consequence by forcing the houses to locate in industrial, commercial
or unpopulated locations.
In granting the injunction, the Needler court ignored a fundamental
conflict between the purpose of a nuisance action, to prevent or halt
interference with a landowner's use and enjoyment of his land, and the
purpose of a halfway house, to rehabilitate criminals. Rehabilitation
of criminals, in theory, reduces the interference (crime) a landowner,
and the rest of society, suffers in the use and enjoyment of property.
By enjoining the rehabilitative effort, the court eliminated short-term det-
riments to some people in the name of the same benefit the halfway
house is attempting to secure on a long-term basis. The court could
have reduced or eliminated this conflict by balancing the purposes of
both the nuisance action and the halfway house. It is not suggested
that halfway houses should never be enjoined as nuisances, but only
that the Arkansas Supreme Court failed to consider several factors im-
portant to the analysis.
parative Injury Doctrine of Nuisance, 49 N.C.L. REv. 402 (1971); Note, No Injunc-
tive Relief in New York Against a Private Nuisance When Defendant's Comparative
Financial Hardship Outweighs the Injury to Complainant, 21 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 1243
(1970). California has reached the opposite result. Hulbert v. California Portland
Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911). See also Riblet v. Spokane Portland
Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 255, 248 P.2d 380, 383 (1952); Powell v. Superior
Portland Cement, 15 Wash. 2d 14, 19-20, 129 P.2d 536, 539 (1942).
29. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 475, 78 N.E.2d 752, 759 (1947);
Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 632, 355 P.2d 229, 232 (1960). See United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (compensation must be paid landowners).
30. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 7, 40-41 (1967); Moeller, The Con-
tinuum of Corrections, 381 ANNALS OF AMER. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 81, 84
(1969).
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